Philosophy of Religion and Ethics

Registration and Pricing

Conference registration is free for all. In addition to paper presentations and plenary sessions, the conference will conclude with a Q&A dinner featuring the keynote speaker and select presenters.

Welcome to Weatherford College

In every age, we wrestle with moral questions. Debates about justice, responsibility, human dignity, and the good life emerge wherever individuals and communities seek to live together meaningfully. Religious traditions continue to shape ethical reflection—sometimes grounding moral insight, sometimes generating deep disagreement about what we owe to one another. How should religious belief inform ethical reasoning? What role does moral philosophy play in evaluating religious commitments and practices? And can philosophy of religion help clarify the ethical demands of life in a pluralistic world?   It is in light of questions such as these that Weatherford College presents the 8th Annual Philosophy of Religion Conference, held April 10, on the theme “Philosophy of Religion and Ethics.”

SCHEDULE • 2026 CONFERENCE

FRIDAY, APRIL 10

• 9:00 a.m. - 9:20 a.m.: Registration & Coffee
• 9:30 a.m. - 10:50 a.m.: Plenary
• 11:00 a.m. - 11:50 a.m.: Session I
• 12:00 p.m. - 12:45 p.m.: Lunch on your own
• 1:00 p.m. - 1:50 p.m.: Session II
• 2:00 p.m. - 2:50 p.m.: Session III
• 3:00 p.m. - 3:50 p.m.: Session IV
• 4:00 p.m. - 5:15 p.m.: Plenary
• 5:45 p.m. - 7:15 p.m.: Dinner and Discussion at Shep's

Friday, April 10

9:30 a.m. - 10:50 a.m.: Plenary I

"Feeling and Emotion: Preliminary Investigation"

ACAD 106

John R. Gilhoolly, Ph.D., Cedarville University

11:00 a.m. - 11:50 a.m.: Session I

"Understanding Montesquieu’s Ambivalence Toward Christianity"

ACAD 106

Bryan Hall and Erica Ferg, Regis University

This paper examines Montesquieu’s seemingly contradictory assessment of Christianity in The Spirit of the Laws. While he often praises Christianity as socially beneficial—promoting happiness, freedom, and moderate government—he also criticizes certain doctrines and practices, such as monasticism, predestination, and religious persecution, for undermining civic responsibility and social cohesion. Scholars are thus divided over whether Montesquieu ultimately views Christianity positively or negatively in terms of its social utility. The paper argues that this tension reflects a deeper division within Christianity itself. Drawing on Bart Ehrman, it distinguishes between the ethical teachings of Jesus and the later institutional development of Christianity. Although Montesquieu does not explicitly make this distinction, it is implicit in his praise of the moral teachings of the Gospels alongside his critique of institutional practices. This interpretive framework reconciles his ambivalence by showing that he consistently supports Christianity’s moral core while criticizing its historical distortions that hinder social and political well-being.

"God’s Love, Virtue, and the Rational Justification of Morality: Considering a Version of the Argument from Completion in Ethics and Metaethics"

ACAD 104

Thomas Pinto-Russell, Stellenbosch University

John Rist argues, echoing Cottingham and Haldane, that secular ethics is incomplete, and that ethics requires God because of the “surd factor” in human nature. Some Christians such as MacIntyre argue at times that ethics only needs species-specific flourishing to be grounded. While Rist agrees all ethical thought and action presuppose the nature of the agent, he rejects grounding morality only in human nature.  Since human nature is by itself incomplete such that it takes God to complete it, hence trying to ground ethics only in (‘Godless’) human nature must always remain an incomplete task. I put Rist’s argument in dialogue with Lewis, Aristotle, Darwall, and Larmore. I press Rist’s arguments on the following related points: (1) whether self-interest is necessarily insufficient to ground a naturalist ethics; (2) whether human nature is incomplete such that ‘the law written on our hearts’ is not apparent and rationally grounded enough without supposing the premise of God’s writing it, guiding the human telos; and (3) whether his argument from completion by integration of the self through God’s love succeeds. I conclude that, while Rist’s account suffers from some plausible objections to (1) and (2), nevertheless his argument from completion (3) is a compelling challenge to much modern ethical theory. 

11:30 p.m. - 12:45 p.m.: Lunch on your own

1:00 p.m. - 1:50 p.m.: Session II

"F (Internal Sovereignty): The Ontological Bridge Between Philosophy of Religion and Human Ethics"

ACAD 106

Fatiha Nesrine Bouzid, Independent Scholar

This paper explores the intersection of philosophy of religion and ethics, focusing on the concept of "Internal Sovereignty" (F) as the foundation of human moral accountability. ​ Abrahamic traditions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—highlight the unique moral status of humans, rooted in their divine connection and capacity for ethical responsibility. ​ The proposed ontological model (A-B.F-N) distinguishes between two components of the human entity: functional processing (B), which encompasses biological and computational logic shared with animals and machines, and internal sovereignty (F), which includes consciousness, conscience, the commanding self, and the capacity for moral veto. ​ This distinction explains why children, the insane, animals, and artificial intelligence (AI) systems are not morally accountable—due to the absence or underdevelopment of F. Empirical evidence from neuroscience supports this model, demonstrating scenarios where F and B operate independently. ​ The paper reinterprets the Qur'anic concept of the self-reproaching soul (al-nafs al-lawwamah) as the ethical veto power of F over B, emphasizing that human responsibility stems from this unique capability. ​ The study concludes that theistic ethics address humans because they alone possess F, and understanding this is crucial for developing integrated ethical theories and guiding AI to protect human sovereignty rather than undermine it. ​

"Christian Nationalism, Common Sense, and Epistemology"

ACAD 104

Brad Palmer, Institute for Philosophical and Theological Research

This project begins with a common sense, popular-level argument against Christian Nationalism, one that the Founding Fathers would and did largely use when separating Church and State. This argument is itself an argument against what many even today take to be a common-sense argument FOR Christian Nationalism. As far as I can tell, the common-sense argument AGAINST soundly defeats the common-sense argument FOR. The only way to attack it, that I can see, is to defer to the weeds of analytic philosophy, which some- for example Rushdoony and Wolfe- have attempted. By my lights, these arguments not only fail by being a bit too pedantic without confronting the common-sense issues, but both versions ultimately fail because of the combination of Epistemological problems and the Golden Rule, i.e. “Use epistemology against your neighbor only if you would allow the same epistemology to be used against you”.

2:00 p.m. - 2:50 p.m.: Session III

“‘Fountain of All Happiness’: Jonathan Edwards and Henry Grove on Virtue”

ACAD 106

Zak Tharp, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

This paper reexamines the intellectual influences shaping the late ethical and theological thought of Jonathan Edwards, focusing especially on his sermons from the 1750s. While Edwards is often viewed as developing his ideas primarily from Scripture and personal reflection, the study highlights his engagement with a broader network of Anglophone and Continental sources, including developments in philosophy, science, and moral theory. Central to the argument is the overlooked influence of Henry Grove, whose writings on ethics and divine action appear to inform Edwards’s mature thinking. By tracing parallels between Edwards’s Stockbridge sermons and Grove’s works—particularly Wisdom the First Spring of Action in the Deity—the paper argues that Edwards drew on Grove to integrate his biblical exegesis with his metaphysical and ethical commitments. This engagement reflects a broader late-career shift toward themes of true virtue, happiness, and divine goodness. Ultimately, the paper situates Edwards within his eighteenth-century intellectual context, demonstrating how his reading habits significantly shaped his ethical vision and theological synthesis.

3:00 p.m. - 3:50 p.m.: Session IV

“The Failure of Moral Objections to Divine Command Metaethics”

ACAD 106

Dennis Plaisted, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

This paper defends Divine Command Theory (DCM), the view that moral obligation is identical to being commanded by God, against the “horrendous deeds” objection (HD). HD argues that if God commanded something like rape or child torture, DCM would imply such acts are morally required. While some responses appeal to God’s essentially good nature to block this possibility, the paper develops a different strategy. It argues that HD depends on a moral assumption—that acts like rape are objectively wrong—that cannot be made from a metaethically neutral standpoint. Critics typically presuppose that such wrongness is independent of God, thereby begging the question against DCM. Even attempts to claim only that such acts are “wrong” (without specifying their grounding) fail, since the source of moral truth is precisely what is under dispute. If moral truths are grounded in God’s nature and reflected in human moral intuitions, then HD loses force, shifting the burden back to the controversial claim that God could command what contradicts the moral order He grounds.

4:00 p.m. - 5:15 p.m.: Plenary II

“Feelings, Emotions, & Normativity”

ACAD 106

John R. Gilhoolly, Ph.D., Cedarville University

5:45 p.m. - 7:15 p.m.: Dinner and Discussion at Shep's