In politics, conservatism and traditionalism do have their virtues. Even policies that appear rational may benefit from the conservative and traditionalist approach of not rushing into new initiatives, but instead learning from past experiences and implementing necessary reforms gradually.
However, for these virtues to function properly, certain conditions must be met. One must understand that traditions themselves change and evolve. Without this understanding, conservatism and traditionalism degenerate into mere regression and reaction, obstructing the development of society and culture.
Today, not only in Japan but across the world, there is a growing reactionary political trend advocating systems and national frameworks that are no longer suited to the times. This tendency often justifies authoritarian and controlling tendencies that strip citizens of their freedoms under the noble-sounding banner of "patriotism." A clear example of this was seen in the recent House of Councillors election, where the Sanseito party gained significant support by advocating constitutional revision inspired by the abolished Constitution of the Empire of Japan that was effective until the end of WWII, and promoting the revival of a polity centered on the emperor (國體, kokutai).
Nearly 80 years have passed since the current Constitution came into effect in 1947. The emperor’s status as a symbol of the state is no longer the subject of major public controversy. Even among conservatives, the idea of returning to a polity centered on the emperor (國體, kokutai) does not enjoy broad support. This is because the symbolic role of the emperor in the current Constitution is not inherently in conflict with the traditional, emperor-centered idea of Japan that conservatives revere.
At the heart of any emperor-centered ideology lies the “Divine Mandate of Eternal Rule” recorded in the Nihon Shoki (Chronicles of Japan, Book II, Age of the Gods, Episode 9). This mandate was passionately emphasized by Shumei Okawa, a thinker who was indicted as a war criminal but ultimately acquitted at the Tokyo Trials, in his book A 2600-Year History of Japan (『日本二千六百年史』Daiichi Shobo, 1939). Nationalists have taken the idea that a line of emperors ruling “unbroken for all ages” was ordained by the gods as proof of the Japanese people's uniqueness and superiority. The Nihon Shoki, compiled in the 8th century by imperial edict, was politically motivated to legitimize the Yamato Imperial Court and consolidate the ritsuryo system (the ancient centralized government structure). Thus, it is undeniable that the Nihon Shoki is a political document. At the same time, it is also true that the idea of an emperor-centered system has, in various forms, been a part of Japanese political thought for over 1,200 years. This explains why not only conservatives and traditionalists, but many others, continue to respect some or all aspects of that ideology.
Yet contemporary Japanese society is neither governed by the ritsuryo code nor by the social order of the Empire of Japan from the Meiji era through World War II. It is a society based on popular sovereignty, the protection of fundamental human rights, and pacifism. Under the current Constitution, the emperor is designated as the symbol of the state. According to Osamu Nishi’s How the Constitution of Japan Was Born (『日本国憲法はこうして生まれた』Chuko Bunko. Chuokoron-shinsha, 2000), the term “symbol” was not necessarily invented by the GHQ. It already existed in the 1931 Statute of Westminster defining the British monarch and was being used in constitutional discussions among Japanese politicians after WWII (Ibid. pp. 170–171). In this sense, the emperor was positioned as a “living symbol of the Japanese people,” detached from state power (Ibid. pp. 171–172, quoting a 1945 memorandum by General MacArthur’s aide, Brigadier General Bonner Frank Fellers). Politically, the most urgent matter for the wartime Japanese government negotiating the terms of surrender was how to position the kokutai, a Japan centered on the emperor, under the new Constitution. This was also a key issue during the drafting of the postwar Constitution. A balanced view of the emperor’s role was ultimately chosen, one that did not lean too heavily toward either conservative or progressive extremes, and that did not contradict the idea of a new, democratic Japan based on popular sovereignty. In the present Constitution, the emperor is understood as a cultural symbol of Japan, and as such exists on a plane different from that of the sovereign power, which resides with the people.
It is well known that, when the current Constitution was being drafted after the war, conservatives criticized it for undermining Japan's autonomy and for its phrasing and content. The argument that it is a “foreign-imposed constitution” does have considerable persuasive power. However, as recorded in the above-cited book, much of the criticism voiced in the House of Peers at the time, such as that of Peer Ushimaro Sawada, was grounded in the logic of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan. Sawada argued that protecting the emperor’s supreme command and the imperial system and the Japanese family/household legal structure was essential to preserving the kokutai (Ibid. p. 361: “What is a monarch without supreme command?”, and “The emperor system is a family system [expanded to the public], and it is needless to say that this constitutes the kokutai; even the household/family system, I believe, is part of Japan’s kokutai. Destroying these two would mean reducing the kokutai to nothing.”). This suggests that conservatives at the time were more focused on rejecting any departure from the old Constitution of the Empire of Japan than on creatively envisioning a new constitutional monarchy compatible with a democratic Japan based on popular sovereignty. They seemingly could not comprehend that under the new Constitution, the Japanese people would no longer be subjects but sovereign individuals, each possessing personal freedom and self-determination. Thus, they made no effort to connect the traditional emperor system, which they claimed to revere, with the realities of the new society. This clearly reveals a failure to understand that even traditions change.
As mentioned above, the Sanseito won many votes in the recent election by advocating a constitutional revision modeled on the old Constitution of the Empire of Japan. But the Constitution of the Empire of Japan has already been abolished. Even if the current Constitution were to be revised, a return to the Constitution of the Empire of Japan is out of the question. This is because the latter lacks the core elements of the current Constitution: popular sovereignty, the protection of fundamental human rights, and pacifism. To use a defunct and regressive constitution as a model for amending the current one runs entirely counter to the spirit of freedom and democracy that defines the present Constitution. This is an issue not of the merits or demerits of conservatism or traditionalism, but of a completely different order: whether we are able to preserve or instead destroy and trample on the foundation of modern Japan and the rights and dignity of its people. Any political agenda that proposes a return to the Constitution of the Empire of Japan and the deification of the emperor must be subject to thorough criticism from an anti-fascist and anti-statist standpoint.
The emergence of political forces advocating such unrealistic and undemocratic constitutional reforms is undoubtedly a sign of the rise of populist and fascist forces. Their slogan of “patriotism” is nothing more than a tool used to justify an authoritarian, unilateral regime and its coercive exercise of power. It is not rooted in deep thought or reflection. If it were, it would not merely glorify the past constitution and its political systems, but also would address how to uphold and improve freedom and democracy as part of patriotic commitment. A conservative should never prioritize undemocratic political ideologies from the past over the fundamental importance of liberal democracy.
Patriotism, in its truest sense, means loving one’s country. But “country” here does not necessarily mean the present political regime or administration. Rather, it encompasses a wide and ambiguous range of things: one’s own life and livelihood, one’s family, the Japanese people, the natural environment, history, culture, national character, and more. To think deeply about what constitutes yamato-damashii (the Japanese spirit) or yamato-gokoro (the Japanese heart), to search through documents and explore the nature of Japaneseness, this, too, can be a patriotic act. Yet what today’s populist/fascist forces are doing is reversing the relationship between nation and people, expanding state power, encouraging discrimination against foreigners and women, dividing people into “enemies” and “friends,” attacking the former, and pursuing only the strength of the state and national power, while proclaiming all of this to be “patriotic.”
Modern populists/fascists exploit the resentment, anger, and frustration that have accumulated among the people – resentment against governments and opposition parties that have failed to respond to real suffering, allowed inequality and injustice to worsen, left property rights unprotected, and permitted the erosion of trust in national finances. They identify and target easily understood “enemies,” and through clever information manipulation and the spread of fake news and conspiracy theories, convert more of the masses into their “friends.” In this context, effectiveness in harming “enemies” or increasing “friends” takes precedence over the rationality or correctness of policy. The idea of “patriotism” is used as a plausible-sounding belief, doctrine, or faith to give their demagoguery and propaganda an air of legitimacy. They demand the people’s obedience to a nation centered on a deified emperor and attempt to make the kokutai, identified with the mythological “unbroken imperial line”, an object of worship. People who hold different views are treated as “enemies,” persecuted, and branded as “anti-national.” Such exclusivism is fundamentally different from a patriotism based on mutual respect and solidarity among citizens. Just imagining a Japan where such populists/fascists have seized power is terrifying.
For example, regarding the “foreigners problem” propagated by populists/fascists: if it is truly the case that Japan’s current legal system and administrative policies are inadequate to prevent illegal acts or conspiracies by foreign powers, then specific instances of such acts or conspiracies should be objectively demonstrated, and legal or policy measures should be proposed to address them. What should not be done is to exclude foreigners, ignore the human rights of undocumented immigrants, or outright deny naturalization and immigration. Such actions, contrary to what populists claim, would in fact harm Japan’s national interest. Denying the movement of labor and the international interdependence of the economy makes economic development in a modern capitalist society impossible.
Carl Schmitt, a legal scholar of the Third Reich under Nazi rule, argued in the 1929 edition of The Concept of the Political that “The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” (Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political, Expanded Edition, University of Chicago Press, Kindle Edition, p.26). He also stated: “The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible” (ibid. p.27).
That the enemy is regarded as “existentially different and alien” (as quoted above) implies that the conflicts that may arise are ultimately violent in nature, potentially leading to war. This is evident from the fact that state authority is based on instruments of violence, namely the military and police. If this is what “the political” entails, then the way populists/fascists use language can be said to be the epitome of political expression, not because the language itself is violent, but because real violence lurks behind it.
Yet if politics is nothing more than this, as Schmitt suggests, then what politics produces is bound to be harsh. The friend/enemy distinction drawn by populists/fascists, their relentless attacks on enemies – this only strengthens the most despairing aspects of political reality. It fosters hatred and division between citizens and between Japanese and foreigners alike, stripping away the potential for material, spiritual, and moral advancement in public life, and rendering violence acceptable and war inevitable.
Furthermore, all cultural traditions, regardless of what they are, are arbitrarily politicized and instrumentalized. Terms such as “patriotism,” kokutai (national polity), and “unbroken imperial line” (bansei ikkei) are no longer examined critically within the diversity of thought that includes both affirmation and denial, nor are they situated within their historical contexts. Instead, they are forcibly dragged into present political debates to reinforce the ideology of populist/fascist political forces and serve as self-righteous propaganda tools for establishing their power. In such a climate, even the basic premise that contemporary Japan is a society founded on freedom and democracy is forgotten. There is little conscious effort to think about what form a constitutional monarchy should take, or how it should be implemented in reality. Instead, abstract and hollow slogans like “the good old” or “beautiful Japan” dominate, and the freedoms, rights, and democracy of real people are disregarded.
There are various proposals for constitutional revision, but any amendment must be grounded in the current Constitution’s core principles: popular sovereignty, the protection of fundamental human rights, and pacifism. It must be aimed at addressing real-world challenges. Proposals modeled after the Constitution of the Empire of Japan are not even a viable starting point for a rational and realistic discussion of constitutional reform. Japanese citizens must recognize that there is now a real and present danger of freedom and democracy being destroyed. What matters most is not being deceived by the unrealistic and irrational demagoguery of populists and fascists, but rather thinking rationally and objectively.
A Japanese version of this article is accessible from: 「最近の日本の政治におけるポピュリスト／ファシストの台頭について」
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Note: The contents of this article reflect the personal views of Taro Yamamoto alone, and do not represent the impressions or opinions of any other individual, corporation, or organization.
The copyright for the photographs (images) used in the body of this document, as well as on the front and back covers, belongs to the author, Taro Yamamoto.
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(c) 2025 Taro Yamamoto